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SPECIAL REPC)RT

tax nt1tes~'

States. Recent cases have tested - and cases still in
progress continue to test - the validity olf several
Treasury regulations:

Mayo and the Future of
Tax Regulations
By Steve R. Johnson

1. On January 11 the Supreme Court decided

Mayo, the culmination of controversy over the
validity of a regulation dealing with employment taxes for medical residents and other
student-employees. 1
2. Section 6015 prescribes a two-year limitations period for claims for spousal relief under
section 6015(b) and (c), but it is silent as to a
limitation period for claims for spousal relief
under section 6015(£). By regulation, Treasury
established a two-year limitations period for
section 6015(f).2 The Tax Court has repeatedly
held that regulatory provision invalid. Thus
far, the Tax Court has been reversed on this
issue by the Third Circuit3 and the Se~venth
Circuit,4 and the Sixth Circuit is expected to
weigh in soon.s
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Of the heady early days of the French Revolution, Wordsworth wrote: "Bliss it was in that dawn
to be alive. But to be young was very heaven."
Those of us interested in the intersection of tax law
and administrative law may be excused if we feel
similar exhilaration about the time in which we live.
In terms of the intersection, this is the most
exciting moment in the tax history of the United
TAX NOTES, March 28, 2011

3. Section 6501(e) creates a six-year limitations
period for income tax assessments w.hen a
return omits income exceeding 25 perc.ent of
reported income. The IRS maintains that this
extended period also applies when overstatements of basis lead to the requisite understatement of income. Treasury promulgated a

1Mayo Fo1111dation for Medical EJ11catiot1 & Rrseurclr v. U11ited
States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (Jan. 11, 2011), Doc 2011-609, 2011! TNT 8-10.
For discussion of Mayo, see Irving Salem, "Ma.Vo Dissected:
Some Dragons Slain, Some Still Breathing Fire," Tux Notes, Mar.
14, 2011 , p. 1327, Doc 2011-4255, 2011 TNT 50-5.
2 Reg.

section 1.6015-S(b)(l).

:1Man11el/a v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 196 (2009), Doc· 2009-8425,
21109 TNT 69-21, rev'd, 631 F.Jd 115 (3d Cir. 2011), Doc 2011 -1183,
2011 TNT 13-10.
4
L.antz v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 131 (2009), Doc 2009-7979,
2009 TNT 65-8, rev'd, &,.)7 F.Jd 379 (7th Cir. 2010), Doc WJ0-12604,
2010 TNT 110-17. For discussion of this case, s~ Bryain T. Camp,
" Interpreting Statutory Silence," Tax Notes, Aug. 2, 2010, p. 501.
Doc 2010-13289, or 2010 TNT 148-6 (arguing that thE! Tax Court
was right in Lantz and the Seventh Circuit was wnmg).
!>Hall v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. No. 19 (Sept. 22, 2010), Doi.·
2010-207.U , 2010 TNT 184-11, on appeal, No. 10-2628 (6th Cir.);
Buckt1er v. Commissioner, No. 12153-09 (T.C. 2010) (unreported
order), 011 appeal, No. 10-2056 (6th Cir.). Hall is in the briefing
stage. Brickner has been fully briefed and is awaiting oral
argument.
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temporary regulation, now replaced by a permanent regulation, enshrining the IRS's interpretation.6 The temporary regulation was
invalidated by the Tax Court, whose decision
is now on appeal to the D.C. Circuit, with oral
argument scheduled for April 5.7 Four other
circuit courts have already weighed in on the
issue. On January 26 the Seventh Circuit held
for the IRS on the issue (although it did so as
a matter of statutory construction, with only
dicta as to the validity of the regulation). 8 On
February 7 and February 9 the Fourth Circuit
and the Fifth Circuit, respectively, held against
the IRS, refusing to accord Chevron deference
because the section was seen as unambiguous.9 On March 11 the Federal Circuit held for
the IRS, according the regulation deference
under Chevron. 10 The issue remains pending in
the Tenth Circuit. 11
4. The section 263 Uniform Capitalization regime is implemented in part by a regulation
setting forth the so called "associatedproperty" rule. 12 In a case of first impression,
the Court of Federal Claims considered the
validity of the regulation. The court found
discrepancies in the regulation and saw it as
stretching the boundaries of reasonableness.
Nonetheless, on February 25, the court reluctantly upheld the regulation. D
This report is about Mayo. As a Supreme Court
decision, it is the most authoritative of the recent
cases, and it has been cited in arguments in other
recent cases challenging tax regulations. When relevant, this report also addresses these other cases. 14

6
Reg. section 301.6501(e)-1T(a)(l)(iii), Tl71/aced by T.D. 9511,
Doc 2010-26662, 2010 TNT 240-11, accompanying reg. sections
301.6229(c)(2)-1 and 301.6501 (e)-1.

7

Intermo11ntai11 Insurance Seroices of Vail LLC v. Commissioner,

134 T.C. 211 (2010), Doc 2010-10163, 2010 TNT 88-12.
8
Beard v. Commissioner, 2011 WL 222249 (7th Cir. Jan. 26,
2011), Doc 2011-1764, 2011 TNT 18-10. The taxpayer has asked
the Seventh Circuit to reconsider Beard en bane.
9
Home Co11crell' & Supply LLC v. United States, 107 AFTR2d
2011-767 (4th Cir. 2011), Doc 2011-2674, 2011 TNT 26-7; Burks v.
Commissioner, 107 AFTR2d 2011-824 (5th Cir. 2011).
10
Grapevine Imports Lid. v. United States, 2011 WL 832915 (Fed.
Cir. 2011), Doc 2011-52.U, 2011 TNT 49-14.
11
Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, No. 09-9015 (10th Cir.),
Doc 2010-14410, 2010 TNT 125-18.
12
Reg. section 1.263A-11 (e)(l )(ii)(B).
13
Dominion Resources Inc. v. United States, 107 AFTR2d 20111033 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 2011), Doc 2011-4145, 2011TNT40-11.
14
The cases are not just doctrinally significant. They also
have significant revenue implications for taxpayers and the
federal fisc. The government estimates that Social Security taxes
on medical residents can be as much as $700 million per year
and that had it lost Mayo, it would have had to pay out more
than $1 billion in refunds of overpayments. Set•, e.x. Inside
1

Mayo is a helpful case in that it clarifies the
analytical process to be used when taxpayers challenge the validity of Treasury regulations. In general, Mayo confirms directions in which the
administrative rules of tax have been moving, and it
clears out much of the accreted debris of outdated
thinking.
Part I describes the facts of Mayo and the Supreme Court's decision. Part II explains the ways in
which Mayo clarifies the law governing challenges
to the validity of tax regulations. Part III seeks to
allay the fear that Mayo fundamentally shifts the
balance in a pro-government direction in cases in
which Treasury regulations are challenged. Finally,
Part IV discusses some likely post-Mayo battlegrounds.
I. Mayo Facts and Decision
Under FICA, both employers and employees are
subject to tax, based on wages. 15 Excluded from
taxation, however, are amounts paid for "service
performed in the employ of ... a school, college, or
university . . . if such service is performed by a
student who is enrolled and regularly attending
classes at such school, college, or university." 16
The Mayo Foundation and the University of Minnesota offer residency programs that train doctors.
The programs are multiyear and emphasize
hands-on experience. Residents often spend 50 to 80
hours a week examining patients, making diagnoses, prescribing medication, recommending plans
of care, and performing procedures. Residents are
supervised. They are paid between $41,000 and
$56,000 annually and are provided medical insurance, malpractice insurance, and paid vacation time.
In addition to learning through service, Mayo
residents participate in structured education. They
are assigned material to read, attend lectures and
conferences, and take examinations.
The issue in Mayo was whether medical residents
fit within the FICA exception for students. Treasury
regulations promulgated in 1951 provide ~hat the
exception applies to students who work for their
schools "as an incident to and for the purpose of
pursuing a course of study." 17 Until 2005, the "incident to" determination was made case by case. 1H

Higher Ed, "Medical Residents Ruled Employees," ai1ailable al
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/01/12/supreme_
court_says_medical_residents_not_students_for_tax_purposes
Oan. 12, 2011).
1
5sections 3101(a) (FICA tax on employees) and 3111(a)
(FICA tax on employers).
u'Section 3121(b)(10).
17
Reg. section 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d).
18
£.8 ., Rev. Rut. 78-17, 1978-1 C.B. 307.

(Footnote continued in next column.)
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In late December 2004, Treasury amended the
regulation to provide that the exception applies
only when the educational aspect predominates
over the service aspect. 19 The amended regulation
categorically provides that services as a full-time
employee (including scheduled work of more than
40 hours a week) are not within the exception. 20
The Mayo Foundation and the University of
Minnesota challenged the validity of the amended
regulation. The district court agreed with the taxpayers,21 in part because of its reading of the
Supreme Court's pre-Chevron, tax-specific National
Muffler decision. 22 The circuit court reversed, concluding that the nontax Chevron decision23 provided
the governing standard and that, under Chevron, the
amended regulation was valid.24
In an opinion by Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.,
the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the circuit court. The Court held that (1) Chevron, not
National Muffler, controls25; (2) section 3121(b)(10) is
silent or ambiguous as to the definition of the
student exception26; and (3) the amended regulation
reasonably interprets section 312l(b)(10).27
II. What Mayo Does
Taxpayers have been challenging the validity of
tax regulations for nearly as long as there have been
tax regulations. 2s As a result, many cases specific to
tax existed before Chevron was decided.29 The preChevron cases had uncertainties; Chevron itself (as
modified by subsequent cases) has been far from a
model of clarity30; and the relationship of the two
lines of authority was unsettled. The intersection of
these three sets of ambiguities created a doctrinal
mess, for which the Supreme Court itself bore a
considerable share of the blame.31 For example, in
post-Chevron tax cases, the Court sometimes cited

19

Reg. section 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d)(3)(i).
Reg. section 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d)(3)(iii).
21
503 F. Supp.2d 1164 (D. Minn. 2007), Doc 2007-18316, 2007
TNT 153-7.
22
National Muffler Dealers Ass'n Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S.
472 p979).
:z: Cht.>vron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
24
568 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 2009), Doc 2009-13439, 2009 TNT
112-75.
25
Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 712-714.
26
Id. at 711.
27
ld. at 716.
28
E.g., Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79 (1938).
29
See cases cited in notes 69-75 infra.
30
See, e.g., Coeur Alaska Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation
Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458, 2479 n.• (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(citing cases applying Chevron but reaching inconsistent results).
31
The Court significantly modified Chevron in United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). Justice Scalia describes Mead as
an "inscrutable opinion ... whose incomprehensible criteria for
20

National Muffler and other times cited Chevron without explanation of why one case and not the other
was being cited.32
Mayo improves the situation. Five aspects of the
case are noteworthy.
First, it was generally agreed long before Mayo
that Chevron provides the standard when a taxpayer
challenges a specific authority regulation issued
under a delegation in some section other than
section 780S(a).33 However, courts34 and comrnentators35 disagreed about whether Chevron also governed challenges to the validity of regulations
promulgated under section 7805(a)'s general delegation to Treasury of authority to "prescribe all
needful rules and regulations for the enforcement"
of the code.
That debate is now over. Mayo makes it clear that
Chevron provides the controlling standard for general authority regulations too,36 particularly when
the regulation has gone through the notice and
comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),37 as the regulation at issue in
Mayo had.
Second, Mayo undercuts the distinction that traditionally has been drawn between specific authority and general authority regulations. Some courts
- including the Supreme Court - and some commentators used to say that general authority regulations receive less deference than specific authority

Chevron deference have produced so much confusion in the
lower courts." Coeur Alaska, 129 S. Ct. at 2479-2480 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
J2Compare United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532
U.S. 200, 219 (2001), and Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Commissioner,
499 U.S. 554, 560-561 (1991) (both citing National Muffler) with
Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v. Commissioner, 523 U.S. 382, 387
(1998), and United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 246 n.4 (1985)
(both citing Chevron).
JJE.g., Carlos v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 275, 280 (2004), Doc
2004-18624, 2004 TNT 183-9; Square D Co. v. Commissioner, 118
T.C. 299, 307 (2002), Doc 2002-7591, 2002 TNT 60-8, ajfd, 438 F.3d
739J7th Cir. 2006), Doc 2006-2877, 2006 TNT 30-9.
· E.g., Swallows Holding Ltd. v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 96
(2006), Doc 2006-1541, 2006 TNT 18-10 (applying National Muffler), rev'd, 515 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2008), Doc 2008-3372, 2008 TNT
33-41 (applying C/tevron).
:\!>Compare John F. Coverdale, "Court Review of Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in the Cl1evron Era," 64 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 35 (1995) (arguing that Chevron should not apply to
Treasury regulations) to Steve R. Johnson, "Swallows as It Might
Have Been: Regulations Revising Case Law," Tax Notes, Aug. 28,
2006, p. 773, Doc 2006-14217, or 2006TNT167-105 (arguing that
Cl1evron should apply to general authority tax regulations).
:it•Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 714.
7
J 5 U.S.C. section 553.

(Footnote continued in next column.)
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regulations. 38 Others doubted the usefulness or the
validity of that incantation.39
Previous cases had wounded the traditional distinction. 40 Mayo deals it a mortal blow. The Court
noted that "the administrative landscape has
changed significantly" since the old cases expressing
the traditional view,41 and it remarked: "Our inquiry
[as to deference] does not turn on whether Congress's delegation of authority was general or specific."42
Third, Mayo continues the debate about interpretive method at Chevron's step one. What sources
may a judge legitimately consult in ascertaining
whether the statute is ambiguous? The answer
depends on which judge is writing the opinion.
When a textualist judge does so, as Justice Clarence
Thomas did in Brand X, the focus will be limited to
the language and structure of the statute (perhaps
with a constructional canon or two).4.1 When a
purposivist judge writes the opinion, as Justice John
Paul Stevens did in Chevron itself, a wider angle of
vision will be used, 44 including legislative history
and other indicators of congressional intent.45
Chief Justice Roberts is a textualist, so unsurprisingly the step one analysis in Mayo is constrained in
scope, with principal attention paid to the language
of the statute.46 Although this is interesting, it could
hardly be called profoundly significant. The next
time a purposivist judge writes a step one opinion,
he is unlikely to feel constrained by Chief Justice
Roberts's approach.
Fourth, Mayo's approach to the step two inquiry
also is interesting. What are the criteria by which one
decides whether the agency's interpretation is reasonable? It might be argued that the only acceptable
measures of reasonableness are those that bear on

38
E.g., United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24
(1982); Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981).
39
£.g., Boris I. Bittker et al., Federal Income Taxation of Individuals 46-5 (2002); Johnson, s11pra note 35, at 780-781.
40
£.g., Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437, 448 (2003), Doc
2003-5648, 2003 TN1' 43-7 (noting that although the tax regulation at issue was general authority in nature, "we must still treat
the regulation with deference").
41
Ma110, 131 S. Ct. at 713.
42
1d. 113-114.
43
National Cable & Telecomn11micalicms Ass'n v. Brand X Internet
Services, 545 U.S. 967, 989 (2005) (conducting the step one
inquiry by reference to the statute's "plain terms'').
44
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 (referring to use of "traditional
tools of statutory construction" to ascertain the "intention" of

at

Con~ress).

4
• For an illustration of the clash, compare Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg's opinion for the Court in Regions Hospital v. Shala/a,
522 U.S. 448 (1998), witll Justice Scalia's dissent in that case.
46
Set• Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 711.
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accuracy of meaning.47 For example, the relevant
ambiguity in Mayo involves the definition of student
under section 3121(b)(10). It could be maintained
that only indicia bearing on the characteristics of
students versus the characteristics of employees
should be taken into account.

Mayo, however, was not so limited. One consideration that led the Court to conclude that the
amended regulation is reasonable is that compared
with a facts and circumstances inquiry, a categorical
approach improves administrability, avoiding "the
wasteful litigation and continuing uncertainty that
would inevitably accompany any purely case-bycase approach."48
Administrability, of course, is a process value,
not an accuracy indicator. Indeed, inherent in administrability as an operative value is that some loss
of classificatory precision is acceptable to enhance
predictability, preserve resources, and the like.49
Thus, the teaching of Mayo is that the step two
reasonableness inquiry is not limited to accuracyof-meaning considerations but includes process values as well. so
Finally, the ever-growing complexity of American law requires professionals to specialize. That
survival necessity imposes costs, however: a tendency to tunnel vision and ignorance or rejection of
currents moving the broader law. Tax exceptionalism (carving tax out of rules of general application

47

See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
411-412 (1971) (emphasizing that the reasons for agency choices
should relate to the considerations and purposes Congress
made relevant to the statute at hand).
48
Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 715 (quoting United States v. Correll, 389
U.S. 299, 302 (1967)); see also Coeur Alaska, 129 S. Ct. at 2479
(Scalia, J., concurring) (identifying predictability and ,reduced
litigation as goals Chevron should promote); Lantz, 607 F.3d at
485.
4
•>see, e.g., Kenneth W. Gideon, "Assessing the Income Tax:
Transparency, Simplicity, Fairness," 25 Oliio N.U. L. Rev. 101
(1999); Steve R. Johnson, "The E.L. Wiegand Lecture:
Administrability-Based Tax Simplification," 4 Nev. L./. 573,
582-584 (2£Xl4).
511

Arguably, however, administrability is a consideration

Congress intends to be relevant to every statute. Thus, even
when the statutes in question require an agency to make
individualized determinations (as, for example, section 6015(f)
does), courts have allowed agencies to adopt bright-line rules to
resolve classes of issues that arise frequently in the individual
cases. E.g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 243-244 (2001) (prison
punishment case); American Hospital Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606,
612 (1991) (collective bargaining case); Heckler v. Campbell, 461 (
U.S. 458, 467 (1983) (disability benefits case).
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without the warrant of compelling contextual differences) and tax myopia are understandable but
ultimately undesirable, as 151 and others have argued. 52
Mayo is powerful ammunition against tax exceptionalism. In concluding that the law had evolved
past National Muffler and the traditional "general
authority versus spe~ific authority" cases, Mayo
cited five cases - all' of them nontax cases.53 This
pattern of citation dispels the idea that tax is an
island untouched by the waves lapping on other
administrative shores. Indeed, Mayo made the point
explicitly. It stated:
Mayo has not advanced any justification for
applying a less deferential standard of review
to Treasury Department regulations than we
apply to the rules of any other agency. In the
absence of such justification, we are not inclined to carve out an approach to administrative review good for tax law only. To the
contrary, we have expressly recognized the importance of maintaining a uniform approach to
judicial review of administrative action. 54
III. What Mayo Doesn't Do
What Mayo does is to clarify the law, as shown in
Part II above. What Mayo doesn't do is fundamentally alter the balance of power between taxpayers
and the government in cases in which the validity
of Treasury regulations is challenged. Any fear on
the part of taxpayers that tax regulations will now
be effectively immune from challenge would be
exaggeration on the order of Chicken Little's "the
sky is falling!"
I say this for three reasons. First, holding that
Chevron applies to challenges to general authority
tax regulations isn't revolutionary - the clear trend
of the law was already in that direction. In his dissent
in the Tax Court's 2006 Swallows Holding decision,
Judge Mark V. Holmes tabulated the circuits. He
found that six circuits applied Chevron in cases involving general authority regulations, that five cir-

51
Steve R. Johnson, "lntem101mtain and the Importance of
Administrative Law in Tax Law," Tax Notes, Aug. 23, 2010, p.
837, Doc 2010-15990, 2010 TNT 163-4.
52
E.g., Paul L. Caron, "Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don't Let Your
Babies Grow Up to Be Tax Lawyers," 13 Va. Tax Rev. 517 (1994);
Kristin E. Hickman, "The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference," 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1537 (2006).
53
See Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 713-714 (citing Mead; Chevron; Brand
X; Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83 (1990); and Long Island Care at
Home Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007)).
54
Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 713 (punctuation omitted). In support of
this proposition, the Court quoted one nontax case, Dickinson v.
Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999), and cited another nontax case,
Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212 (1989).
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cuits rejected Chevron in that context, and that two
circuits had no clear position on the issue.ss Since
then, two circuits (the Third Circuit in Swallows Holding and the Eighth Circuit in Mayo) moved from the
National Muffler camp into the Chevron camp, and
one circuit (the Second Circuit) that previously took
no side in the controversy seemed to be edging toward Chevron. 56 Moreover, the Tax Court - which
had been a principal holdout against the trend hedged its bets by stating in several cases that it need
not choose between National Muffler and Chevron to
decide the case at hand.57 The Tax Court also applied
Chevron in cases involving general authority regulations when compelled to do so by the Go/sen rule. 58
In short, Mayo merely confirmed where the law was
headed in any event.
Second, that a case is analyzed under Chevron is
far from a guarantee that the agency will prevail.
Chevron is usually considered a deferential standard
favorable to the agency. 59 However, that need not be
the case. When a judge wants to invalidate an agency
position, the usually preferred approach is to declare
that the statute is unambiguous - and adverse to
the agency's view. 60 Less frequently, but still often
enough that the possibility can't.be ignored, judges
accept that the statute is ambiguous but find the
agency's interpretation to be unreasonable. 61

5

sswallows Holding, 126 T.C. at 180-181.
See Natlrel v. Commissioner, 615 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2010), Doc
2010-12160, 2010 TNT 106-12.
57
E.g., Estate of Gerson v. Commissioner, 127 T.C. 139, 154
(2006), Doc 2006-21771, 2006 TNT 206-15, ajfd, 507 F.3d 435 (6th
Cir. 2007), Doc 2007-25098, 2007 TNT 219-17. The Tax Court is
56

not the only court to have used this strategy. (t has happened
often enough "that there has now appeared the phenomenon of
Chevron avoidance - the practice of declining to opine whether
Chevron applies or not." Coeur Alaska, 129 S. Ct. at 2479-2480
(Scalia, J., concurring); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, "How
Mead Has Muddled judicial Review of Agency Action," 58 Vand.
L. Rt>v. 1443, 1464 (2005).
58
E.g., Mannella, 132 T.C. at 201; Feller v. Commissioner, 135
T.C. No. 25, at *6 (2010), Doc 2010-24040, 2010 TNT 216-16; see
Go/sen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970) (holding that the Tax
Court will apply the law of the circuit to which the case is
apRealable), a.ffd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971).
59
See, e.g., William D. Popkin, Materials on Legislation: Political
Ltmguage 1md the Political Process 582 (4th ed. 2005) (calling
Chevron a "super-deferential approach").
0
" E.g., Antonin Scalia, "judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations of Law," 1989 Duke L./. 511, 520-521; Mark
Seidenfeld, "A Syncopated Clievron: Emphasizing Reasoned
Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes," 73 Tex. L. Rev. 83, 94-95 (1994); Note, "'How Clear Is Clear'
in Clrevron's Step One?" 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1687, 1691-1692 (2lXl5).
61
E.g., Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Northpoint Teclz. Ltd. v. FCC, 412 F.Jd 145 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Abbott
Laboratories v. Young, 920 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 819 (1991). A recent illustration is the dissent in
Mannella, which would have held a regulation under section
6015 to be invalid at Chevron's step two. Mannella, 2011 WL
(Footnote continued on next page.)
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Perhaps America's greatest contribution to philosophy is pragmatism. Despite the shift from the
common law to statutes and regulations as the principal instruments of lawmaking, the single most important word in the Anglo-American legal tradition
remains "reasonableness." Judges steeped in the tradition will usually find doctrinally palatable ways to
uphold regulations they find reasonable and to
strike down regulations they find unreasonable. 6 2
There is ample play in Chevron's doctrinal joints
to allow invalidation of overreaching tax regulations. Mayo does not change that.
Third, correctly understood, National Muffler was
a weak reed for taxpayers fo rely on. Chief Justice
Roberts accepted that National Muffler is a less
deferential standard than Chevron.6.1 In this, he was
buying a notion that has been peddled in recent
years by lawyers and judges looking for ways to
justify invalidating particular regulations. However, both the chief justice and the purveyors of this
notion are wrong. Properly understood, National
Muffler is a deferential case.
I make here as to Mayo an argument similar to
that I made in criticizing the Tax Court's (later
reversed) Swallows Holding decision. 64 The part of
National Muffler that some have latched onto is its
listing of six considerations:
A regulation may have particular force if [1] it
is a substantially contemporaneous construction of the statute by those presumed to have
been aware of congressional intent. If the
regulation dates from a later period, [2] the
manner in which it evolved merits inquiry.
Other relevant considerations are [3] the
length of time the regulation has been in effect,
[4] the reliance placed on it, [5] the consistency
of the Commissioner's interpretation, and [6]
the degree of scrutiny Congress has devoted to
the regulation during subsequent reenactments of the statute. 65

What the Mayo taxpayers (and other taxpayers)
said was: "Aha! One or several of those six considerations is absent as to the regulation here at issue.
Therefore, National Muffler dictates that this regulation receive little or no deference." Mayo rejected
this argument. The Court disposed of several of the
above considerations as arguments against the
regulation:
• "We have repeatedly held that agency inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze
the agency's interpretation under the Chevron
framework. " 66
• "We have instructed that neither the antiquity
nor the contemporaneity with a statute is a
condition of a regulation's validity."67
• "We have found it immaterial to our analysis
that a regulation was prompted by litigation."68
The type of argument used by the Mayo taxpayers ignores context and distorts National Muffler.
I offer three points in that regard. First, National
Muffler was not a solitary event. It was one of a line
of pre-Chevron, tax-specific cases, and that line was
deferential in nature. 69
Second, the spirit of Nationql Muffler itself was
deferential. In the opinion in that case, the six
considerations were bracketed by deferential language. They are preceded by the Court's acknowledgement that Congress delegated to Treasury, not
to the courts, the authority to prescribe needful
rules and that Treasury regulations should be upheld if they implement the statute "in some reasonable manner."70 The considerations are succeeded
by the Court's injunction: "The choice among reasonable interpretations is for the Commissioner, not
the courts."71 So bracketed, it would be myopic to
see the six National Muffler factors as hostile to
regulatory flexibility.

i
'-'

l

66
Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 712 (punctuation omitted) (quoting
Brand X, 545 U.S. at 981, and citing United States v. Eurodif S.A.,
129 S. Ct. 878, 887 (2009)). Indeed, Chevron itself involved an

149379 at "'10-"'13 (Ambro, J., dissenting). In addition, in the
Dominion Resources case cited supra note 13, the Court of Federal
Claims came "very close" to invalidating a tax regulation at
Chevron's step two. 107 AFTR2d 2011-1033, at"' 20.
62
Indeed, the whole of Chevron boils down to reasonableness.
A regulation contrary to an unambiguous statute is per se
unreasonable. Thus, any regulation that would be invalidated at
step one also would be invalidated at step two. Chtrvron can
therefore be condensed to the simpler formulation that "administrative regulations issued pursuant to authority delegated by
Congress must be upheld unless unreasonable." Ltmtz, 607 F.3d
at 481.
63
Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 712-713.
64
Steve R. Johnson, "Swallows Holding as It ls: The Distortion
of National Muffler," Tax Notes, July 24, 2006, p. 351, Doc
2006-13093, 2006 TNT 142-37.
6."'National Muffli•r, 440 U.S. at 477 (numbers added).
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agency (the Environmental Protection Agency) cha,nging its
previous position. For discussion of other aspects of Treasury
and IRS inconsistency, see Steve R. Johnson, "An IRS Duty of
Consistency: The Failure of Common Law Making and a
Prof,osed Statutory Solution," 77 Tenn. L. Rev. 563 (2010).
7
Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 712 (punctuation omitted) (quoting
Smiley v. Citibank (Soutlr Dakota) N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740 (1996)).
The regulation at issue in Chevron was not contemporaneous
with the statute under which it was promulgated.
68
Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 712 (punctuation omitted) (quoting
Smiley, 517 U.S. at 741, and citing United Dominion Industries Inc.
v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 838 (2001)).
69
See, e.g., Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co., 450 U.S. 156,
169 (1981); United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 550 (1973);
Correll, 389 U.S. 299.
70
National Muffler, 440 U.S. at 476-477 (citing many cases). .
71
Id. at 488.
·
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Third, it is worth remembering what actually
,happened in Nntionnl Muffler. The Court upheld the
·'regulation being challenged in that case. Moreover,
it upheld the regulation even though it lacked
contemporaneity, one of the six listed considerations.72
Tn sum, the Mayo taxpayers attempted to turn
Nat irmnl Muffler on its he<1d. National Muffler was a
deferential case in a deferential line of cases. ln that
light, the six considerations should be viewed as
shields to protect tax regulations, not swords with
whid\ to attack them. That is, National Muffler
should be read as saying tha t when one or more of
the six considerations are present, the regulation is
entitled to even more than usual deference - not
that when one or more are absent, the regulation is
due less deference. The six are plus factors, not
negative factors.
This reading of National Muffler is supported by
the deferen tial context of the case. It also is supported by the language the Court used to introduce
the six considerations: "A regulation may have
particular force if.... " Tha t is positive language,
not negative language.
The positive view of the six National Muffler
considerations also is supported by their derivation.
The six were not inventions. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, writing for the Court, offered them as a
distillation of previous cases of the pre-Chevron,
tax-specific line. Following the distillation, Justice
Black.mun cited7'.I two cases of the line: South Texas
L11111ber74 and Wimnill. 75 Both of these cases were
deferential in nature, both upheld the regulations
being challenged, and both used considerations
among the six to reach that result. 76
In seeing the six considerations as positive, not
negative, factors, I read what the Court did in Nntionrli Muffler as similar to what it did in Dixon, another pre-Chevron tax-specific case.77 [n Dixon, the
taxpayer contended that the [RS abused its discretion when it gave retroactive effect to its withdrawal
of an acquiescence to a prior case. ln part, the taxpayer relied on Automobile Club of Micf1igan, in which
the Court had upheld another retroactive IRS ac-

72 /rl.

at -185.
73 /d. at 477.

7
''Cmnmissio11er v. South Texas Lu111/1er Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501
( 1948).
75 Wi11111il/, 305 U.S. at 133.
71
'5imila rly, courts deciding deference questions in nontax
contexts often have treated Natio1111/ M1!ffeer-li ke considera til•ns
as positive factors. E.g., Coe11r Alaska, 129 S. Ct. <ti 2479 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (using lhe consistency of agency practice as a
positive factor in upholding the agency's position in a n e11viro11me11tal law case).
n Di:ro11 11. U11iterl Sin/cs, 381 U.S. 68 ( 1965).
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tion. 78 The taxpayer argued that considerations mentioned in A11/omobile Club were not present in Dixon,
and therefore Dixon should be decided adversely to
the JRS. The Supreme Court rejected that argument:
Although we mentioned certain facts in support of our conclusion in Automobile Club that
there had not been an abuse of discretion in
that case, it does not follow that the absence of
one or more of these facts in another case
wherein a ruling o r regulation is npplied retroactively establishes an abuse of discretion. 79
The considerations mentioned in National Muffler
should be understood as positive factors, not negative factors, just as Dixon understood that the consid erations mentioned in Automobile Club were
positive, not negative, factors. The attempt by the
Mayo taxpayers to apply the National Muffler consid erations negatively was a misuse of National
Muffler.
Jn this respect, Chief Justice Roberts's opinion for
the Mayo Court threw the baby o ut with the bath
water. The misuse of N11lionnl Muffler by taxpayers
(and by some judges, sud1 as the Tax Court majority
in Swallows Holdint10) had to be stopped, and Mayo
accomplished that end. The better wny lo have
stopped it, however, wou Id have been to explain that
National Muffler is actually a defcrentiaJ case, not to
have accepted that Natio11nl M11Jfler is nondeferentiaJ and then suggest that it is no longer good
law.
Put another w<1y, the destination reached was
good but the cho ice of roads was not. One may
hope that futu re cases will rehabilitate National
Muffler based on a better understanding of it.
To su mmarize Part TU: (1) the clear trend before
Mnyo was to recognize that Chevron applies to
genera l authority tax regulations (at least those that
have gone through the APA notice and comment
process); (2) application of Cltevron does not guarantee that a challenged regulation will be upheld;
and (3) properly understood, National Muffler was
not a pro-taxpayer stand <1 rd, so its denigration by
Mnyo was a small loss to taxpayers.
By emphasizing Chevron, Mayo changes the vocabulary in which taxpayer challenges to tax regulation must be couched. Mayo does not, however,
fundamentally a lter the litig<1ting balance between
taxpayers and the government.

7

HA11tm110/Jile C/1111

<f Mic/1ix1111

v. Co111111issim1t:r, 353 U.S. 180

(1 957).

7'>oixo11, 3Hl U.S. at 76.
MOSee Swallows l/oltli11x. 126 T.C. at 137-138.

1553

COMMENTARY I SPECIAL REPORT

IV. Future Battlegrounds
Questions about the appropriate standards to
apply to challenges to the validity of Treasury
regulations existed long before Mayo, 81 and although Mayo answers some questions, other questions will continue and indeed might be brought
more to the fore as a result of Mayo. Five such topics
are addressed below: (1) regulations promulgated
without notice and comment, (2) textually nuanced
delegations, (3) explanation of regulatory choices,
(4) Chevron and sub-regulation authorities, and (5)
the future of Chevron.
A. Regulations Without Notice and Comment
Post-Chevron cases make it clear that Chevron
does not apply to all cases in which agency positions are challenged. 82 In concluding that the regulation at issue is Chevron-qualified,83 Mayo noted
that the regulation had gone through the notice and
comment process, which has often been identified
by the Court as an important factor as to whether
Chevron applies. 84
Treasury usually submits regulations for notice
and comment, and when it doesn't, one or another
of the APA exceptions85 sometimes applies. But not
always. There are times when Treasury promulgates regulations without notice and comment even
when no statutory exception applies. 86
Mayo does not cover this situation, and the stakes
the situation raises are higher than merely which of
several standards of deference may apply - failure
to follow the APA when required means that the
regulation is invalid.s7

81
For discussion of the law up to 2004, see Irving Salem et al.,
"ABA Section of Taxation Report of the Task Force on Judicial
Deference," Tax Notes, Sept. 13, 2lXl4, p. 1231, Doc 2004-17659, or

2004 TNT 178-26.
82
£.g., Mead Cor11., 389 U.S. 299.
s.1 Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 714.
s-1£.g., Lo11x ls/a11d Care al Home Ltd. v. Cokt•, 551 U.S. at
173-174; Mead, 533 U.S. at 230-231.
s.i;For example, notice and comment is not required when the
regulation is merely interpretive, not binding, 5 U.S.C. section
553(b)(A), or "when the agency finds for good cause (and
incorporates the finding and a brief statement of the reasons
therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure
thereon arc impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest." 5 U.S.C. section 553(b)(B).
86
See Kristin E. Hickman, "Coloring Outside the Lines:
Examining Treasury's (Lack of) Compliance With Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements," 82 N.D. L. Rev.
1727 (2CX>7); Hickman, "A Problem of Remedy: Responding to
Treasury's (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure
Act Rulemaking Requirements," 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rt'V. 1153
(2008).
87
An unfortunate aspect of Cl1evnm and subsequent cases is
sloppy use of the term "deference." Clrt'Vro11 issues can arise in
two very different contexts: (1) whether a purportedly binding
regulation makt..>s valid, enforceable law, or (2) whether a

Some prior cases acknowledged awareness of the
issue but did not resolve it. 88 lntermountain, recently
decided by the Tax Court and on appeal to the D.C.
Circuit, presents the issue via the concurring opinion of judges James S. Halpern and Holmes, which
found the regulation invalid for failure to follow the
notice and comment requirements. 89 I have written
in support of the Halpern-Holmes position,90 and
future cases are likely to pose this issue as well. 91
The validity of regulations promulgated outside the
APA will be a post-Mayo battleground.
8. Textually Nuanced Delegations
When an old tree falls in a forest, sunlight
penetrates to nurture new growth. Mayo disposed
of the traditional notion that general authority
regulations receive less deference than specific authority regulations. What I propose take its place is
greater attention to the precise terms of the delegation set out by Congress in the statute - whether
specific or general - under which the regulation at
issue was promulgated.
As I described in some detail in a previous
report9 2 and will develop in greater detail in a
future one, Congress frames its delegations to Treasury in very different ways in different sections of
the code. Some sections authorize Treasury only to
fill interstices93; others allow Treasury to write new,
major rules94 ; and yet others permit Treasury to
suspend or alter substantive rules set out in the
statute itself.95
Under the maya of the now-discarded traditional
notion, courts in the past too often focused on
whether the regulation was general authority or
specific authority in nature, to the neglect of the
particular language of the delegation at issue in the

nonbinding administrative position should be seen as persuasive. Strictly speaking, "deference" should pertain only to the
second of these contexts, but it has been applied to both.
88
E.g., Hospital Corp. of America v. Commissioner, 348 F.~d 136,
145 n.3 (6th Cir. 2003), Doc 2003-23580, 2003 TNT 211.:B, cert.
de11ied, 543 U.S. 813 (2004); America11 Standard Inc. v. U11ilcd States,
602 F.2d 256, 267-269 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
89
Jntermou11tai11, 134 T.C. at 222-223.
90
Johnson, supra note 51. For additional discussion of l11tt'rmountai11, see Note," Administrative Law," 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1066
(2011).
91
Recently, the Seventh Circuit addressed the controversy
involved in lntermountai11. The Seventh Circuit held for the IRS
on statutory grounds. That court offered its view that tht.>
regulation at issue is valid. However, its remarks in this regard
were dicta, and the court did not address the APA issue. Beard,
2011 WL 222249, at "'7.
92
Johnson, supra note 51, at 850-852.
93
E.g., section 911(c)(2)(B).
94
Sections 1502 and 2704(b)(4).
9
5sections 508(c)(2) and 4261 (e)(3)(C).

(Footnote continued in next column.)
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case. Mayo clears the way for more textually nuanced interpretation of delegations for tax regula1 tions.
Indeed, Mayo instructs that "the ultimate question
is whether Congress would have intended, and expected, courts to treat the regulation as within, or
outside, its delegation to the agency of gap-filling
authority."96 A prime source through which to determine whether that intention exists is the language
of the statute containing the delegation.97 I hope
post-Mayo cases will more fully explore textually
nuanced interpretation of delegations for tax regulations.
C. Explanation of Regulatory Choices
As maintained in Part II, Mayo makes untenable
the parochial notion that tax law stands apart from
administrative law generally. The numerous doctrines of administrative law are fair game in contests about the validity of tax regulations.

,

A recent case, Mannella,98 raises one of those
doctrines: the obligation of an agency to explain the
choices it makes in constructing binding rules.
Some previous tax cases had noted, but usually not
resolved, those issues. 99 The appearance of the issue
in Mannella may prompt taxpayers' counsel to raise
it more often in future cases - especially because
the distorted National Muffler argument is no longer
available. 100

Mannella is one of the cases testing the validity of
the Treasury regulation imposing a time limit on
claims for relief under section 6015(f). Reversing the
Tax Court, the Third Circuit in Mannella upheld the
validity of the regulation. In a dissent, Judge Thomas
L. Ambro said that he would have held the regulation invalid because, in promulgating it, Treasury
had "not advanced any reasoning for its decision to
impose [the] limitations period on taxpayers seeking

96
Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 714 (punctuation omitted) (quoting Long
Island Care, 551 U.S. at 173).

97

"Congress' intent is best determined by looking to the
statutory language that it chooses." United States v. Monsanto,
491 U.S. 600, 610 (1989) (punctuation omitted) (quoting Sedima
S.P.R.L. v. lmrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495 (1985)).
98
Mannella, 631 F.3d 115, was decided by the Third Circuit on
January 19, 2011 - eight days after Mayo.
99
E.g., American Standard Inc. v. United States, 602 F.2d 256,
268-269 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Georgia Fed. Bank F.S.B. v. Commissioner, 98
T.C. 105, 110 (1992).
J0°Even before Mannella, commentary had urged greater use
of the "inadequate explanation" argument. Patrick J. Smith,
"Mayo and Clzenery: Too Much of a Shift in Rationale?" Tax
Notes, Oct. 25, 2010, p. 454, Doc 2010-21077, 2010 TNT 207-12;
Smith, "Omissions From Gross Income and the Chenery Rule,"
Tax Notes, Aug. 16, 2010, p. 763, Doc 2010-16074, 2010TNT158-3.
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relief under subsection (f), leaving us no basis to
conduct the analysis mandated by Chevron Step
Two."Hn
Judge Ambro invoked the Supreme Court's decision in State Farm, an important nontax administrative law case. 102 However, these are deep waters
doctrinally, historically, and as a matter of policy.
Doctrinally, State Farm is part of the broader topic of
"hard look" review of agency decisions. Both the
hard-look doctrine in general and the explanation
requirement in particular have been subject to varying degrees of rigor in judicial application. State
Farm exemplifies a strong form of the rules, but
other decisions have been looser in approach. to3
Historically, State Farm has been refined by several subsequent decisions, including the Supreme
Court's 2009 Fox decision. u14 The government
thinks that one of those decisions - the Supreme
Court's 2002 Verizon decision 10s - vitiates the "failure to explain" argument in the section 6015 context. In a brief filed on January 26 in a pending Sixth
Circuit case, the Department of Justice argued that
State Farm applies only when an agency is changing
its course, not when it is "taking a position in the
first instance." Thus, in OOJ's view, "Judge Ambro's criticism is ... completely misconceived." 106
I doubt that Verizon is the stake through the heart
of Judge Ambro's contention. The Verizon Court was
discussing State Farm in connection with whether the
agency's choice is rationally connected to the purpose of the statute, which is different from whether
the agency must explain why it made the choices it
did.1 07 Moreover, although State Farm did entail an
agency change of position, many other explanation
and hard-look cases involved initial agency positions, not changed positions. 10H Thus, I think the
government will have to formulate a better response
to the "failure to explain" argument.
As a matter of policy, hard-look review has been
very controversial. 109 One aspect of the debate is the

101

Mannella, 631 F.3d at 127.
td. (quoting Motor Vt~hicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983)); see also Adamo Wrecking Co.
v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 289 n.5 (1978).
102

'°3 For discussion of shifting tides in hard look review, see
Richard J. Pierce Jr., Administrative Law 81-86 (2008); Note,
"Rationalizing Hard Look Review After the Fact," 122 Harv. L.
Rev. 1909, 1910-1914 (2009).
'°54 FCC v. Fox Television Stations Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
Verizon Commu11icatio11s Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467 (2002).
106
Brief of Appellant, Hall v. Commissioner, No. 10-2628, at 58
(6th Cir. Filed Jan. 26, 2011).
w7 Verizon, 535 U.S. at 502 n.20.
108
£.g., Overton Park, 401 U.S. 402; SEC v. Cl1enery Corp., 318
U.S. 80 (1943), later opinion, 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
109
see, e.g., Thomas j. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, "The Real
World of Arbitrariness Review," 75 LJ. Clli. L. Rev. 761, 762
(Footnote continued on next page.)
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"ossification" question: whether hard-look review,
or the specter of it, makes issuing regulations more
time consuming and expensive, perhaps even forestalling desirable regulations entirely. 110 Scholars
are divided about these and other putative benefits
and burdens of hard-look review. 1 11
That debate could, of course, occur in the tax
context. Tax regulations entail numerous choices
among numerous alternatives. Judge Ambro's Mannella dissent did not define the scope of the explanation requirement that he would impose on
Treasury. Depending on that definition, some might
argue that the costs of explanation would exceed its
benefits.
This issue also surfaced in Dominion Resources, in
which the Court of Federal Claims upheld a regulation under section 263A. The court accepted that
the duty of explanation applies to tax regulations.
The court remarked: "it is a stretch to conclude that
Treasury cogently explained why it has exercised its
discretion [as it did in the regulation]." 112 Despite
the fact that Treasury's explanation of the key
choices lacked "analytical precision" and were
"even confusing," 113 the court found the explanation adequate because Treasury did provide some
explanation, Treasury responded to the remarks of
commentators, and "the path that Treasury was
taking in the rulemaking proceedings can be discerned, albeit somwhat murkily."114
I have offered tentative views about Judge Ambro's argument elsewhere, 115 and I will address it at

greater length in a future article. The point now
simply is that arguments like "failure to explain"
and other staples of administrative law discourse
will arise with increasing frequency in tax cases in
the post-Mayo environment.

As one who often prefers bright lines to mushy
facts and circumstances approaches, 120 I would be
happy to see this view attain settled status. But that
might not be the case. First, despite Justice Antonin
Scalia's urging, the Supreme Court has resisted
drawing a bright Chevron line. 121 For example, the
Court has stated that the use of the notice and
comment procedure, although often a good indicator of Chevron qualification, is neither a necessary
nor a sufficient condition for applying Che11ron.122

l

(2008); see also Peter L. Strauss, "Overseers or 'the Deciders' The Courts in Administrative Law," 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 815 (2008)
(res~<mding to Miles and Sunstein).
0
Srt•, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, "The Courts and the
Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Pmfessor Seidenfeld," 75 Tex. L. Rev. 525 (1997); Mark Seidenfeld, "Demystifying
Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial
Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking," 77 Tt•x. L. Rc•v.

Spring 2011, at 11; "Johnson: More on Mannella," TaxProf Blog,
Jan. 25, 2011, available at http://taxprof.typepad.com/
taxrirof_blog/2011 /01 /johnson.html.
16
For description of the types of administrative authorities
in tax, see David M. Richardson et al., Civil Tax Procedure 16-2.1
(2d ed. 2008).
117
£.g., Kristin E. Hickman, "lRB Guidance: The No Man's
Land of Tax Code Interpretation," 2009 Miclr. St. L. Rev. 239.
118
Sidmort• v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (listing as
factors "the thoroughness evident in [the agency's] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which
give it power to persuade"); see also Mead, 533 U.S. at 235 (listing
"the merit of [the] writer's thoroughness, logic, and expertise, its
fit with interpretations, and any other sources of weight").
119
E.g., Aeroquip-Vickers Inc. v. Commissioner, 347 F.3d 173 (6th
Cir. 2003), Doc 200.l-22794, 200.l TNT 203-11; Omolrwrdro v.
United States, 3<Xl F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2002), Doc 2002-19316,
2002 TNT 162-20; Salem et al., supra note 81, at 744-750. But set•
Ryan Lirette, "Giving Cl1evro11 Deference to Revenue Rulings
and Procedures," Tax Notes, Dec. 20, 2010, p. 1357, Doc 201024589, or 2010 TNT 245-7.
120
See, e.g., the judicial "cry from the heart" about problematic facts and circumstances determinations in Biedenlzam Realtt1
Co. v. United States, 526 F.2d 409, 414-415 (5th Cir. 1976).
·
121
Compare Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1003-1004 (Breyer, J., concurrin~kto id. at 1014-1019 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
E.K., Barnlrart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002).

l

483 (1997).
111
St>t', '"K·• Jim Rossi, "Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard

Look Doctrine and Federal Regulatory Efforts to Restructure the
Electric Utility Industry," 1994 Wis. L. Rt"lJ. 763; Rossi, "Antitrust
Process and Vertical Deference: Judicial Review of State Regulatory Inaction," 93 Iowa L. Rev. 185, 225 (2001) (calling the
Chem•ry explanation principle a "foundation of administrative
law, frequently serving as a basis for agency reversal"); Seidenfeld, "Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking," 87 Come/IL. Rev. 486 (2002); Peter
L. Strauss, "Revisiting Ovt•rton Park: Political and judicial Controls Over Administrative Action Affecting the Community," 39
UCLA L. Rev. 1251 (1992).
112
107 AFTR2d para. 2011-1033, at ..22 (punctuation omitted)
(quoting State Fum1, s11pm, 463 U.S. at 48).
113
107 AFTR2d para. 2011-1033, at *22.
114
ld. (punctuation omitted) (quoting State Fann, supra, 463
U.S. at 43).
11
5steve R. Johnson, "Do Treasury and the IRS Have to
Explain Their Choices?" ABA Section of Taxation NcwsQuartt•r/y,
(Footnote continued in next column.)
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D. Chevron and Sub-Regulation Authorities

Mayo and the other recent cases involve challenges to Treasury regulations. Will we see more
litigation in the future about whether Chevron deference attaches to IRS pronouncements of a lower
level of dignity than regulations, such as revenue
rulings, revenue procedures, notices, announcements, and the like? 116
There has already been much discussion about
this question. 117 The preponderance of cases and
commentary suggests that sub-regulation administrative tax authorities typically should receive deference under the more probing Skidmore standard 118
rather than under Chevron. 11 9
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Second, Treasury and the IRS sometimes omit notice and comment for regulations but sometimes
.1 employ it for sub-regulation pronouncements. 1i.1
In short, the waters are muddy enough that the
application of Chevron to sub-regulation authorities
may grow as an aspect of controversy in the postMayo world. Indeed, the ink was barely dry on
Mayo when a circuit court case reminded us that
notice and comment is not invariably required for
an administrative position to claim Chevron entitlement.t24
E. Future of Chevron
I've saved the broadest of the future issues for
last. Now that tax regulations have been brought
unambiguously within its domain, what may be the
future of Chevron?
It is ironic that after waiting more than a quarter
of a century, the Supreme Court unanimously applied Chevron to tax regulations after a rising chorus
has proclaimed that Chevron has failed. Judge Ambro's dissent125 cites Prof. Jack M. Beerman's article
"End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How
Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be
Overruled. " 126
Beerman is far from alone. Many other commentators (both tax 127 and nontax) have suggested that
Chevron has failed, either empirically (because it is
at best haphazardly applied) 128 or normatively (for
many reasons, including that Chevron is contrary to
the APA and that it lacks an adequate theoretical
foundation).1 29 But, of course, there isn't uniformity
of view as to Chevron's success or lack of it. Chevron
still has defenders.130

123
For example, in 2010 the IRS developed a new schedule,
Schedule UTP, to be attached to the returns of business taxpayers to disclose uncertain tax positions taken on their returns.
In doing so, the IRS used the notice and comment process. See
Announcement 2010-75, 2010-41 IRB 428, Doc 2010-20922, 2010
TNT 186-26, and Announcement 2010-9, 2010-7 IRB 408, Doc

I share the opinion of Chevron's critics. Chevron is
the most widely discussed principle of administrative law. 131 Yet it is, in a sense, an accidental
doctrine - the Court did not appreciate when it
decided Chevron that the case would attain the
significance it has.1 32 Perhaps the Court would have
thought more carefully about the underpinnings
and consequences of its opinion had it had that
foresight. In any event, both because of its original
weakness and because of its massaging by subsequent cases, the skein of Chevron is now so knotty
that its untanglement may be impossible.
This does not cause me to lament Mayo. Until the
Supreme Court abrogates Chevron, tax should be
subject to Chevron no less than any other area of law
is. The weaknesses of Chevron argue for the case's
overthrow or reform generally rather than serving
as an excuse for tax exceptionalism.
Despite the trenchant criticisms of Chevron, I
doubt that the Supreme Court will accept Beerman's invitation to overrule it. The unanimity of
Mayo suggests that the Court is in no such mood.
Nonetheless, as identified in Part Il above, significant questions remain as to the nature of the inquiries to be made under the Chevron framework. The
practical and theoretical problems with Chevron will
affect the resolution of those questions. In light of
Mayo, we in the tax community have a vital interest
in that resolution, and we cannot remain indifferent
to the larger debates about Chevron and its future.
V. Conclusion

Mayo is a welcome decision. It settles several
important questions that had lingered too long. I
doubt that Mayo will change the outcomes of many
litigated cases, but it will allow us to arrive at the
right answers with less wasted motion. Standing on
the platform of Mayo, we can now reach toward
resolution of other issues as to the validity of
Treasury regulations.
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